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Material Deprivation, Social Class and Life Course in the 
Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Donnacha Ó Beacháin*
Abstract 
This article begins by chronicling and evaluating the reaction of the government of Kazakhstan to Sacha 
Baron Cohen’s fi lm Borat—Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefi t Glorious Nation of Ka zakh stan. 
It then compares and contrasts the offi  cial government reaction with the expressed attitudes of local 
members of Kazakhstan’s young English-speaking elites. This study is based on the results of a survey of 
almost fi ve hundred young university students conducted in March 2007 at the Kazakhstan Institute of 
Man age ment, Economics and Strategic Research (KIMEP), the most prestigious university in the country. 
The sample gives a snapshot of those most likely to have been aware of Borat - the young, internet-savvy, 
educated urban elite - and inter alia provides insights into how respondents in Kazakhstan thought the 
movie impacted their country and would infl uence how they were treated abroad. The survey results 
suggest that while responses to Borat were heterogeneous, most students accepted that the choice of 
Kazakh stan as a target for satire was coincidental rather than conspiratorial. Despite offi  cial eff orts to ban 
the movie, a majority of the respondents had seen the fi lm and believed that the ban was a mistake. Also, 
while recognising that Borat would raise Kazakhstan’s profi le in the world, respondents doubted it would 
increase knowledge, and some feared a change in their treatment when travelling abroad.
Keywords: Kazakhstan, Borat, KIMEP, Sacha Baron Cohen, Nazarbayev.
Introduction
Though the Borat phenomenon has inspired several academic articles, most notably a Slavic Review 
special issue,1 comparatively little has been written on how this cinematic sensation, which catapulted 
Ka zakh stan to the forefront of Western consciousness, has impacted upon the Kazakhstani general 
public. Even those that have tried to partially focus on Kazakhstan’s response (Saunders 2007, Schatz 
2008) have almost exclusively concentrated on the reaction of the Nazarbayev regime. The fact that no 
research has been conducted to determine how non-government actors received the Borat phe nom e-
non has led some like Paula A. Michaels to detect a new orientalism at play:
Like the nineteenth-century orientalist scholars whose writings established the image of the east in the 
European imagination, Borat hijacked Kazakhstan’s ability to defi ne itself in the Western world. The mass 
media then further silenced Kazakhstan by circumscribing the debate about the fi lm in such a way as to 
place Kazakhstani concern and sentiments outside the frame of discussion. (Paula A. Michaels 2008: 82)2
1 Volume 67/1 (Spring 2008)
2 Michaels criticises the foci but also the lack of Kazakhstani writers contributing to the debate.
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The survey on which this article is based was carried out to gauge whether the actions of the 
government of Kazakhstan mirrored popular sentiment amongst those most likely to have seen Borat 
- young, internet savvy, English-speaking students. There has been a tendency to equate government 
with popular outrage (for example Manat, 2006), but did those who were sampled agree that the 
movie constituted a slur on their nationality? This article is a modest eff ort to direct the microphone 
towards the Kazakhstani public, to capture and quantify the diversity of views on this major event in 
the branding of Kazakhstan in the international arena.
The Borat phenomenon and the Kazakhstan government’s response
Borat is based actually on a guy I met in southern Russia. I can’t remember his name. He was a doctor. 
The moment I met him I was totally crying. He was a hysterically funny guy, albeit totally unintentionally. 
(Sacha Baron Cohen, BBC 2006)
Anti-Semitic, misogynistic, chauvinistic, homophobic – these are just a few characteristics of Borat 
Sagdiyev, the faux Kazakh character that is the brainchild of British comedian Sacha Baron Cohen. 
Borat had been a regular feature in Cohen’s popular Channel 4/HBO series Da Ali G Show but was 
relatively unknown in Kazakhstan even among young internet users before the advent of the Borat 
movie.3 The Kazakhstan embassies in London and Washington kept a watchful eye on his activities, 
issuing ritual denunciations that produced little publicity and fewer results. Battle was only truly 
enjoined when ‘Borat’ hosted the MTV Europe awards, arriving in an ‘Air Kazakh’ plane piloted by a 
one-eyed drunkard. An apoplectic Kazakhstan foreign ministry stated that ‘we do not rule out that 
Mr. Cohen is serving someone’s political order designed to present Kazakhstan and its people in a 
derogatory way,’ and threatened legal action to prevent ‘new pranks of this kind’ (Saunders 2006). 
It was unclear at what court and on what grounds Kazakhstan would or could sue, but the threat 
refl ected a determination to meet the Borat challenge head on. The offi  cial borat.kz website was shut 
down in the same manner the government successfully contained domestic opposition; rather than 
confessing to political censorship or intolerance of critical views, technical reasons were devised for 
the closure (Daily Mail 2006a, Cukier 2005). However, as the government was quick to discover, it 
was now facing a challenge quite unlike that of regular opposition politics in Kazakhstan.4 As Borat 
was not a citizen of Kazakhstan and not even a real person, the Kazakhstani authorities could not 
intimidate him. The website was simply reopened on another server (borat.tv) from which the sniping 
could continue uninterrupted. The response of Nazarbayev’s regime merely breathed more life into 
the Borat phenomenon. Cohen, always in character, posted a web video applauding ‘his’ government’s 
decision to ‘sue this Jew,’ and invited ‘captains of industry’ to come to Kazakhstan for its ‘incredible 
natural resources, hard working labour and some of the cleanest prostitutes in whole of Central Asia’.5 
These were the opening salvos in a surreal duel between an entirely fi ctional character and a very real 
national government. How could a regime, which constitutionally prohibits off ending the ‘honour 
and dignity’ of the president, handle a satirist who told the world that Nazarbayev off ered ‘hand-relief’ 
for three quarters the price of similar service providers in Amsterdam? The simple answer is ‘not well’. 
Dariga Nazarbayeva, the president’s daughter, cut a lonely fi gure within Kazakhstan’s political elite 
when, in April 2006, she lamented that Borat’s website ‘damaged our image much less than its closure, 
which was covered by all global news agencies’. Her then husband and deputy foreign minister Rakhat 
3 The author, an Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies at KIMEP at the time, occasionally 
asked classes whether they had encountered the Borat character on TV or the internet, but prior to the MTV 
awards no student claimed to have seen it.
4 For recent overviews of politics in Kazakhstan see Issacs (2010) and Ó Beacháin and Kevlihan (2011).
5 The video response can still be seen at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFVN59sR4lY. At time of writing well 
over 3 million people had watched the clip.
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Aliev chimed in by inviting Cohen to come and see the ‘real Kazakhstan’ (Kennedy 2006). Their views 
did not predominate, however. When the fi lm opened at box offi  ces around the world in early Novem-
ber 2006, it was banned not only in Kazakhstan but also in Russia. In both cases, politics not art 
predominated, but rather than issue offi  cial edicts, both governments hid behind the deci sions of other 
bodies. In Russia, the Federal Culture and Cinematography Agency simply refused to grant the fi lm a 
licence, while Kazakhstan’s main movie distribution chain Otau Cinema instigated the ban saying that 
‘we consider this movie off ensive, a complete lie, and nonsense’ (Pallavi 2006, Moscow Times 2006). 
Nazarbayev’s regime spent millions (it will never be established how much) on countering the Borat 
phenomenon by buying lavish paid supplements in Western newspapers and journals such as the New 
York Times, International Herald Tribune and Foreign Aff airs. Nazarbayev visited the US shortly before 
the fi lm premier and, remarkably, it was reported that the Borat movie would be discussed during the 
Bush-Nazarbayev summit (Daily Mail 2006a).  Outside the White House, Cohen – as always in charac-
ter – upstaged Nazarbayev as he fed the news-hungry media scrum with a press release denouncing 
suggestions that the Kazakhstani president was displeased with the fi lm as lies propagated by the ‘evil 
nitwits of Uzbekistan’ (Daily Mail 2006b). Roman Vasilenko, the Kazakhstani embassy’s indefatigable 
press secretary, was denounced as an Uzbek impostor for claim ing that Kazakhstan provided equal 
rights for women and religious freedom. The Kazakhstani govern ment continued the counter-
off ensive; two Western PR companies were hired, and additional ‘edu cational’ advertisements were 
purchased for television and print media. But while Kazakhstan adver tised in glossy supplements full 
of charts and statistics, Borat was boasting of his country’s recent ‘2003 Tulyakev reforms’, which in-
cluded allowing women to travel on the inside of buses, removing regulations requiring homosexuals 
to wear blue hats, and raising the age of consent to eight.
Borat the movie was an instant commercial success, making over a quarter of a billion dollars at 
the box-offi  ce, obtaining an Oscar nomination for the best adapted screenplay, and winning a Golden 
Globe for Cohen’s performance. Globalisation, the internet and media power had, in this battle at 
least, inverted the power balance so that a national government with huge oil resources found it 
diffi  cult to combat a solitary comedian. Unable to suppress the laughter, the Nazarbayev regime 
fi nally - albeit reluctantly and very self-consciously - tried to join in. When it came, the change was as 
sudden as it was unexpected. In an article on 4th October in the Guardian, Kazakhstan’s ambassador 
to the UK complained bitterly of how it was ‘apparently permissible to paint the people as a bunch of 
rabid Jew-haters and serial sexual molesters’ (Idrissov 2006a). However, exactly a month later the same 
ambassador in an article published in The Times shifted the tone and emphasis signifi cantly. Not only 
was Cohen described as ‘a remarkable comic talent /…/ capable of making many of – myself included 
– laugh out loud,’ but his spoof had provided ‘the kind of media attention of which previously I could 
only dream’ (Idrissov 2006b). Borat was based on a Russian not a Kazakh, the ambassador pointed 
out, the village scenes were fi lmed in Romania not Kazakhstan, and ‘Borat does not look remotely like 
a Kazakh’. He denied any attempt to sue Cohen or that the government had spent millions on a PR 
counter-off ensive. The volte-face represented a belated recognition that by refusing to take the joke 
and beating its breast, Kazakhstan was simply digging itself into an ever-deeper hole of ridicule and 
advertising its intolerance of criticism. It also laid the groundwork for Nazarbayev’s impending offi  cial 
visit to the UK – his fi rst since 2000. The Kazakhstan News Bulletin reprinted a Reuters story reporting 
that Nazarbayev ‘welcomed the attention lavished on his country by the comedy fi lm ‘Borat’’. At his 
joint press conference with Tony Blair, Nazarbayev cited the old adage that there was no such thing as 
bad publicity, though he also repeated the now jaded counterpoints of how Cohen had never visited 
Kazakhstan and that the Kazakhstan scenes had been shot in Eastern Europe. Nazarbayev had been 
well schooled at this stage and invited journalists to express amusement with him: ‘This fi lm was 
created by a comedian so let’s laugh at it, that’s my attitude /…/ Maybe the journalist himself, Borat 
Sagdiyev is here representing Kazakhstan? I would very much like to speak to him if he is’ (Kazakhstan 
News Bulletin, 22 November 2006: 1-2).
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Despite the apparent penitence, Kazakhstan’s government battled on, the mantra now being 
presenting the ‘real Kazakhstan’. The Kazakhstan News Bulletin and Kazakhstan’s Echo, published 
weekly by the embassy to the US and Canada, faithfully refl ected offi  cial attitudes. On 2 November, 
2006, the Bulletin devoted an entire issue to reprinting articles refuting the Borat line on Kazakhstan 
with headlines such as ‘Take that, Borat’. The 11th December issue of Kazakhstan’s Echo was dedicated 
entirely to a reprint of an article by Nazarbayev that rattled off  Kazakhstan’s achievements with the 
rather unfortunate headline ‘Who Needs Borat? Here’s the Kazakh President’. On 16 January, 2007, a 
renewed round of the culture war was heralded in a banner headline of the Kazakhstan News Bulletin. 
Entitled ‘Nomad vs. Borat: Showdown in Theaters Near You’, the former being described as ‘an epic 
movie about the struggle of Kazakhs for their survival as a nation’ and an opportunity for Americans to 
see ‘the real Kazakhstan’ (January 16, 2007: 1-2).  A 9-minute propaganda video ‘Kazakhstan: Reaching 
for the Future’ was produced, posted on youtube and made freely available on demand from the 
embassy (Kazakhstan News Bulletin, 16 January, 2007: 6). The video was also shown by Kazakhstan’s 
US Ambassador Kanat Saudabayev during his February 2007 university tour to highlight the diff erences 
between Borat and offi  cial Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan Echo special issue, 22 February, 2007). Well-placed 
op-eds penned by ‘ordinary’ Kazakhs, and almost certainly offi  cially inspired, proliferated in the 
American media to be reprinted and circulated by the Kazakhstani government (Abdygaliyeva 2006, 
Sadybekova 2007).
This apparent change in the offi  cial government line was hollow rather than heartfelt; Kazakhstan 
is not a democracy, and censorship is generally aimed at protecting regime prestige as much as public 
sensitivities. The Kazakhstani government found Borat threatening because, as Schatz has pointed 
out, ‘international perceptions and image making may spill over into domestic discursive space in 
unpredictable and unimaginable ways’ (Schatz 2008: 52). We now turn to the survey to examine 
what exactly were these unpredictable and unimaginable eff ects on those young, computer-literate 
and English-speaking Kazakhstanis most likely to have seen the Borat fi lm. Through them we may 
understand more the full impact of the phenomenon on Kazakhstan’s population and the extent 
to which the government’s fears were justifi ed and combative eff orts successful. The survey was 
conducted at the Kazakhstan Institute of Manage ment, Economics and Strategic Research (KIMEP) 
during a single week of the Spring 2007 semester, when the Borat movie was still running in movie 
theatres across the world.
The survey: profi le of KIMEP and those surveyed6
Founded on 1 January, 1992, by a resolution of President Nazarbayev, KIMEP quickly distinguished itself 
from other universities, particularly in the high percentage of foreign faculty, and is generally considered 
the premier educational institution in Kazakhstan. Classes are conducted entirely in English and the 
university has led the way in providing Western-style education in Kazakhstan, using the American 
credit system. Tuition fees are high, and although some scholarships are provided, the university has 
a reputation for catering to the country’s wealthy elite, many of whom no doubt will play infl uential 
roles in Kazakhstan’s future development. In all, 479 students participated in the survey, representing 
about 10% of the total student body. Students from all departments in the social sciences and business 
colleges were surveyed. The vast majority of respondents were undergraduates and under the age of 
22 (94%), while the mean age of the sample was 19.35 years. Twenty-one diff erent majors were listed 
and, refl ecting the gender imbalance at the university, female respondents outnumbered males by 
almost two to one. Of those who indicated their ethnicity (95.4%), Kazakhs were the largest group 
with 73.7% of the total, followed by Russians (14.7%), Koreans (3.7%) and Tatars (2.6%). This refl ects 
6 Each survey respondent was assigned a number and throughout subsequent sections the contributions are iden-
tifi ed by their number, which is listed after each quotation or point of view.
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an over-representation of Kazakhs in the university and under-representation of ethnic minorities, 
particularly Slavs and Germans.7 Almost all of these ethnic minorities were citizens of Kazakhstan. 
Students from 43 cities and towns participated, though Almaty students were by far the largest group 
constituting almost half (47%) of respondents (see Table 1).
International students made up just over 3% of the respondents, almost exactly the amount for 
the entire university. While not a representative sample, the value of the survey is in taking a snapshot 
of Kazakhstan’s most elite student populace, and how they reacted to their country’s newly found 
notoriety as the Borat phenomenon played out globally.8 It represents a modest, though unique, 
attempt to gauge opinions in Kazakhstan while Borat was still playing in movie theatres. 
Why Kazakhstan?
Why has Baron Cohen chosen Kazakhstan as the vehicle for his comic talents? (Edin Iidrissov, Kazakhstan’s 
Ambassador to the UK 2006b)
When Borat put Kazakhstanis under the global spotlight, they were unsure of what to do with 
their fi fteen minutes of fame. The question ‘why Kazakhstan’ evoked a myriad of answers. Some 
students were simply bewildered, ‘I cannot understand why exactly Kazakhstan was chosen. I was 
angry and confused,’ (56) opined a Kazakh female, while her ethnic Korean classmate fumed, ‘I don’t 
know why they chose Kazakhstan, but if they so decided they should consult our government and tell 
trust worthy and right things’ (58). A large body of students accepted that the choice was most likely 
random, and dozens used the metaphor of twirling a globe and Baron Cohen’s fi nger landing on an 
7 According to the 1999 census, ethnic Russians constituted 30% of the population and there still existed sizeable 
minorities of ethnic Ukrainians, Germans, and Uzbeks (see Ó Beacháin 2007)
8 The survey, which contained both open-ended and close-ended questions, is a coincidence sample, conducted 
in over twenty classes across a variety of disciplines, colleges and subjects. It does not pretend to constitute an 
accurate demographic refl ection of the Kazakhstani population.
Table 1: Respondent’s city of origin 
Almaty 224 46.8%
Shymkent 33 6.9%
Astana 23 4.8%
Karaganda 20 4.2%
Aktau 13 2.7%
Taraz 13 2.7%
Ust-Kamen 13 2.7%
Aktobe 12 2.5%
Atyrau 11 2.3%
Uralsk 10 2.1%
Kostanai 8 1.6%
Zhezkazgan 8 1.6%
Pavlodar 7 1.5%
Other 53 11.1%
No Answer 31 6.5%
Total 479 100%
Source: author’s compilation
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unfortunate Kazakhstan. While some argued that Baron Cohen, like Westerners generally, treated all 
the ‘Stans’ as a unifi ed whole in terms of culture and way of life, others derived succour from believing 
that Kazakhstanis were singled out for their maturity and level of development compared to their 
Central Asian neighbours. As one respondent put it, ‘I think that Kazakhstan is a more interesting 
issue to interpret, than Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan. I’m sure that this choice is not random, I mean it 
is special’ (162). Others attributed more sinister motives like an attempt ‘to defeat the Kazakhstani 
people with this fi lm’ (468) or the result of ‘chauvinistic, fascist temptations’ (131).
A large proportion of those surveyed attributed political motives to the choice. As one student put 
it, ‘it was an order from the US government to show Kazakhstan in such a way, that we are uncivilised, 
we are wild. I think this fi lm is so stupid, because Americans are stupid /…/ Maybe they wanted to alarm 
all countries that Kazakhstan is not a democratic country, but they could do it in another way’ (120). 
Others attributed the decision to broader international relations; Kazakhstan alternately had betrayed 
an ally (276), was the victim of a misunderstanding (477), had been chosen for its ‘neutral political 
infl uence in foreign aff airs’ (359), or because Kazakhstan pretends to be something it is not’ (192). 
Other suggestions included neutralising Kazakhstan’s ambitions to become one of the world’s top 50 
developed countries or punishing Astana for aligning itself more with Russia than the United States 
(358, 359, 465). An ill-defi ned conspiracy to damage the image of Kazakhstan and thereby take control 
of its natural resources was regularly articulated. Many took pride in Kazakhstan’s achievements 
and wondered whether there was a plot afoot to halt the stride of this new Asian tiger. ‘Kazakhstan 
is becoming more powerful every year,’ a respondent noted, ‘it may be some policy to make our 
reputation weak’ (21). An ethnic Russian claimed that ‘maybe the reason is that the Americans used 
our territory, our resources (oil). Why can’t Kazakhstani people rule these resources? Maybe [the 
movie was made] in order to show the weaknesses of Kazakhstan’ (249). These types of responses 
suggested a current of opinion in Kazakhstan that questioned America’s dominant role in the world 
and perceived its infl uence in Central Asia as detrimental to Kazakhstan’s national interest. A variation 
of the ‘Kazakhstan is persecuted’ type of argument was the common suggestion that Kazakhstanis 
had been singled out by the fi lmmakers as a peace-loving or politically weak people who would not 
retaliate for the scurrilous attacks on their national honour. According to this view, the screenwriters 
and their sponsors had chosen Kazakhstan as it was ‘the only country in Asia that is able to react 
normally to such things, without starting a war or making terror acts’ (190) or ‘because we wouldn’t 
do anything bad to them; we are not aggressive, as we are supposed to be’ (419). Another respondent 
claimed that Kazakhstan had tried to build friendly relations with all countries and was, therefore, 
perhaps ‘the only Muslim country that would do nothing, and the Kazakhstani government would 
not pay any attention to it and maybe look at it with humour’ (397). These views very much echoed 
those of Kazakhstan’s ambassador to the UK, when he wrote that ‘critics’ of Kazakhstan, including 
Baron Cohen, were more likely to be invited on an all-expenses paid trip to Kazakhstan than to receive 
a fatwa (Idrissov 2006a). Another twist on this theme was that the movie was somehow devised to 
determine Kazakhstan’s commitment to peace and harmony in the face of provocation: ‘Kazakhstan 
is known to be preaching its hospitality, peacefulness and positive attitudes to other nations (no 
radicalism)’, one student argued, ‘this was some kind of experiment to test whether Kazakhstani 
citizens are inclined to be nationalistic’ (348).
Many respondents understood that the movie had little to do with Kazakhstan, which was chosen 
for its anonymity, arguing that ‘the major goal of this movie is to show American life, their feelings, 
ideals and thoughts’ (12), and that ‘the fi lmmakers wanted to laugh at the Americans because they 
don’t know countries like Kazakhstan’ (227). A latent anti-Americanism was evident in many of the 
responses, however, and students often couched their objections in dismissive portrayals of American 
society. While asserting that Cohen had exploited American ignorance of Kazakhstan, scores of 
students took off ence at their unjustifi ed lack of recognition, which they duly attributed to American 
‘stupidity’:
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They think we are nomads or part of China or Russia (157)
They still think it’s the same as Iraq or etc (168)
The stereotype is that Kazakhstan is only like a desert (202)
Such respondents were clearly frustrated with Kazakhstan’s obscurity; students regularly 
claimed that the country was a leader within the post-Soviet or Central Asian world, but that its 
accomplishments had gone largely unnoticed and now were submerged by the Borat phenomenon. 
Some turned this against Americans; was it not indicative of American ignorance that they did not 
know of the world’s ninth largest country (this statistic was routinely cited)? At times, Americans, 
Westerners and fi lmmakers were often rolled into one as ‘they’: ‘[the movie was made] because they 
think that we are a young country and have no strong power. But they are mistaken. They think we are 
stupid and live in a steppe without any understanding of the whole world. And also they are mistaken’ 
(123). Another contribution put Borat in the context of Asian migration to England: ‘Very soon England 
will be overcrowded by people from the Asiatic states, and there is nothing else left for Englishmen 
but just laughing at how they incorrectly speak English’ (198). A small number (though often claiming 
to refl ect popular gossip) thought that Cohen was extracting revenge for negative experiences with 
Kazakhs (121, 127, 217). 
Only a few students debated whether the character Borat had some basis in either locally stereo-
typical or actual Kazakhstani national characteristics. Some respondents argued that Cohen had 
identifi ed something in Kazakhstan worthy of satire: according to one student it was ‘always easier to 
fi nd something strange and funny in alien culture,’ and Kazakhstan was an easy target as ‘culturally 
we are extremely diff erent’ (119). An alternative spin was the suggestion that Kazakhstan was chosen 
because ‘people [had] got used to the humour and jokes about Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’ 
(369), indicating that the student believed that comic yarns about their neighbours had managed 
to travel outside the post-Soviet sphere. International students sometimes off ered a diff erent per-
spec tive, but rarely did they form a consensus. Confl icting attitudes were common even between 
visiting undergraduates from the same country. One international student claimed that Kazakhstanis 
‘should not blame these fi lm-makers, because as I’m living in Kazakhstan I see many people whose 
behaviour is very similar to the heroes shown in the fi lm’ (218), but their compatriot was much more 
sympathetic: ‘maybe people living in other countries might think that all Central Asian people behave 
like Borat, but as a foreign student [in Almaty] I know that it’s not true’ (370). 
Beating the Borat ban
Despite the ban in Kazakhstan and Russia, almost half (46.6%) of those surveyed had seen the Borat 
fi lm. Most had watched the movies on a computer using a legal (bought abroad) or pirated disc, while 
smaller numbers had downloaded the movie from the internet or watched the movie on a foreign 
channel, in an internet café or in the university dormitory. A couple of students had seen the movie 
abroad. The fi gures demonstrate the importance of access to the internet and computers, facilities 
still unavailable to many Kazakhstanis. According to the CIA Factbook, Kazakhstan was estimated to 
have only 400,000 internet users in 2005. This limited penetration is partially due to exorbitant costs,9 
but familiarity with the internet is disproportionally high among the 16-24 age group (McGlinchey & 
Johnson 2007).
 Some of those surveyed, like the Kazakhstani government, had diffi  culty in distinguishing between 
the fi lm-makers and the country where the fi lm was made. These respondents often assumed that if it 
was permitted to produce or watch such a movie, government endorsement of its contents could be 
9 Cost in 2005-6 was about $2 an hour at internet cafes and about the same for home connection (author’s experi-
ence).
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assumed. Ethnic Kazakhs were more likely than other nationalities to have seen the movie, suggesting 
that they may have felt more of a vested interest in how Kazakhstan was portrayed. Almost half 
(48.5%) of the Kazakhs found a way to watch the movie compared to the other major groups - Russians 
(34.3%) and Koreans (29.4%). Moreover, Shymkent, arguably the most traditional city in Kazakhstan, 
stood out with 72% (24 of 33 students) having watched the movie, while Ust-Kamemorgorsk and 
Pavlodar, two of the most Russifi ed cites in the east and north of the country, had the lowest viewing 
rates (16.6% and 14.3%, respectively). 
Most students surveyed (71.6%) believed that the majority of people in Kazakhstan were familiar 
with Borat. It is unlikely that this accurately refl ected reality and may simply mirror the fact that as 
young, English-speaking, computer literate, and generally aﬄ  uent students, they as a body knew of 
the Borat phenomenon. Certainly, the written responses suggested that Borat was known primarily to 
the urban young. As one commented, ‘journalists, young people, politicians are aware of this, but the 
majority is busy with something diff erent rather than wasting time on [sic] such movies, my parents 
do not know about Borat’ (153). Another said that the majority could not know as ‘they live in rural 
areas, and have much more important problems to deal with’ (356), while another noted that ‘most 
people, especially in rural areas, are indiff erent to external aff airs’ (348). Almost half (45.7%) knew the 
name of the actor who played Borat but were less clear on his origins. Thirty students stressed that 
Cohen was Jewish (6.3%) while another three (0.6%) identifi ed him as Israeli. Over a third of students 
surveyed (37.2%) correctly identifi ed Cohen as British, 7.3% thought him American. More than half 
(51.1%) claimed not to know where the scenes depicting Kazakhstan were fi lmed, over a quarter 
(26.9%) correctly identifi ed Romania, while the remainder answered erroneously.
A clear majority disagreed with the decision to ban the movie with just over a third agreeing (see 
Table 2 below). There was no substantial diff erence in attitudes towards the ban between those who 
had seen the movie (35.4%) and those who had not (34%).
Some agreed with the government prohibition, considering the movie ‘an abuse of national dignity’ 
(37), while another claimed it would reduce ‘panic /…/ and people won’t hurt as much’ (295). A large 
body of students, both for and against the ban, emphasised that the movie was easily available to 
all those who wanted it. Others pointed out that the prohibition had simply increased its popularity. 
Those who were against the ban cited freedom of speech arguments, the damage to Kazakhstan’s 
image, and argued that the health and maturity of a nation could be measured by its attitude towards 
issues like the Borat fi lm. As one young Kazakh woman from Almaty put it,
Preventing the fi lm from broadcasting in Kazakhstan was a huge mistake. We showed the rest of the 
world that we really have no humour (particularly our offi  cials), rather than laugh with others about 
Table 2: Do you agree with the Borat ban?
Yes No Don’t Know No Answer Total
Men 58 (34.7%) 101 (60.5%) 3 (1.8%) 5 (3%) 167
Women 106 (35.0%) 170 (56.3%) 5 (1.7%) 21 (7 %) 302
Ethnic Kazakh 124 (36.8%) 192 (57%) 3 (0.9%) 18 (5.3%) 337
Ethnic Russian 20 (29.9%) 39 (58.2%) 5 (7.5%) 3 (4.4%) 67
Ethnic Korean 4 (23.5%) 12 (70.6%) 0 1 (5.9%) 17
Ethnic Tatar 1 (8.3%) 10 (83.3%) 0 1 (8.3%) 12
Other Ethnicity 12 (50%) 11 (45.8%) 0 1 (4.2%) 24
Ethnicity not stated 5 (22.7%) 14 (63.6%) 0 3 (13.6%) 22
KZ citizen 157 (35.1%) 258 (57.7%) 8 (1.8%) 24 (5.4%) 447
Non-KZ citizen 5 (31.3%) 10 (62.5%) 0 1 (6.2%) 16
Citizenship not stated 4 (25%) 10 (62.5%) 0 2 (12.5%) 16
Source: author’s compilation
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ourselves. Kazakhstanis have known about this fi lm anyway. The Government should prepare citizens to 
objectively react to the movie. As we know, the fi rst sign of humour is the ability to laugh at yourself. 
Kazakhstan showed that we don’t have it, unfortunately. (158)
Putting Kazakhstan on the map
A majority of the respondents believed that the movie would increase awareness of Kazakhstan, but 
students were less sure if it would enhance knowledge. Whereas many said Kazakhstan was now on 
the map, others felt that ‘it’s better to be unknown altogether than known in such a way’ (124). Some 
students had digested Nazarbayev’s refi ned position on Borat: ‘As our president Nursultan Nazarbayev 
said, “It’s just a movie, who really wants to see Kazakhstan, you’re welcome”’ (450), stated a Shymkent 
respondent, while another claimed that ‘Borat’s movie was good advertising for our country … 
everybody understands that it’s just a joke! Moreover, our president Nursultan Nazarbayev spoke 
positively about the movie and even invited Mr. Cohen to Kazakhstan’ (241). 
Most respondents (55.5%) thought that the movie was bad for Kazakhstan’s image. Only 15.4% 
thought Kazakhstan’s image would benefi t from the movie, though this was slightly more than those 
who didn’t know (15%) or those who thought there would be no change (11.3%). For some, the answer 
was dependent on their perception of how the fi lm would be received in the West. If Westerners 
thought Borat refl ected typical Kazakhstanis, the impact would be negative. An 18-year-old Kazakh 
student from Almaty spoke in apocalyptic terms:
I think that the Borat movie humiliates Kazakhstan, its culture and people. I know absolutely that some 
American people think everything shown in the movie is true. So, they are shocked when they fi nd that 
Kazakhstan is a civilized, modern, high-culture, fast developing country. Many people – even the majority – 
know nothing about Kazakhstan, and then they start to think that they know our country. The perception 
of Kazakhstan is bad, as a weird savage country where people are crazy and stupid. They may even come to 
Kazakhstan to have some fun. No big investor will after that be interested in Kazakhstani enterprises. Who 
will want to invest in a country where people are like Borat? And then, how will Kazakhstan develop without 
interacting with rich Western countries? Economic growth could stop or become lower (151). 
Dozens of respondents, on the other hand, claimed there was no such thing as bad publicity. A 
large number believed the fi lm would enhance tourism, and several cited a survey conducted by a UK 
travel website, which asked 2800 people to select the country they’d most like to visit; Kazakhstan 
came third, beating such traditional favourites as Spain, France, Greece and Turkey (Kazakhstan News 
Bulletin, 2 November, 2006: 1-2, 1 February, 2007: 5) Certainly, there was much room for improvement; 
only 15,000 Americans visited Kazakhstan annually, and most of these were not tourists but business-
men or prospective adoptive parents.10
Foreigners and Kazakhstan post-Borat
A greater number of students (52.4%) felt that the fi lm would infl uence how they were treated abroad. 
Only a quarter (26%) felt that they would be treated no diff erently, while most of the remainder 
(18.6%) didn’t know. Some added that they would only fi nd out during their next foreign trip. Kazakhs 
were more likely to predict a change (55.19%) than other ethnicities, though the diff erence was not as 
10 Roman Vassilenko, quoted in ‘Inaccurate Borat puts Kazakhstan on map’, USA Today, November 10, 2006. Over 
4000 children from Kazakhstan were adopted by American parents between 1998 and 2006, ‘4000+ American 
Families with Children Adopted from Kazakhstan Personally Feel Impact of Borat’, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, 
2 November 2006, p. 3.  Restrictive and expensive visa requirements have also suppressed demand.
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great as one might have expected. About half of the Russians (47.77%) and Tatars (50%) also expected 
to be treated diff erently, and only a third (31.3%, 33%) were sure they would not be. This suggests 
that respondents believed that because foreigners did not know much about Kazakhstan it would not 
matter that they did not look ‘Kazakh’ or ‘Asian’, it would suffi  ce that they were from Kazakhstan. 
What is also interesting is that many of the small number of other (non-Kazakhstani) Central Asian 
students thought the movie would impact how they were treated; these included all three students 
from Turkmenistan, the solitary Tajik and one of two Kyrgyz students, indicating that these students 
believed foreigners outside the region would not be able to appreciate the diff erence between the 
‘stans’. There was a strong link between how one expected to be treated and whether one viewed 
Americans in the Borat movie as representative of American society.  Indeed, those who thought the 
Americans representative were much more likely (64.5% vs. 43.5%) to expect to be treated diff erently 
abroad as a result of the Borat movie. Correspondingly, those who thought the Americans in the movie 
unrepresentative of US society were generally almost twice as likely to rule out the possibility of such 
a change (39.1% vs. 22.1%). 
Several students were enthusiastic about the increased attention, and most seemed to agree 
that for better or worse the days of Kazakhstan’s obscurity were over. ‘It will be easier to meet new 
friends,’ enthused one student (129), while another reported that ‘my friend who studies in the 
UK says that the British started to be interested in her, just because she’s from Kazakhstan’ (399). 
Expectations often depended on the perception of Westerners; those who thought Westerners are 
gullible and undereducated feared the worst. Those who had travelled to the West since the movie 
release testifi ed to the extensive publicity aff orded to Kazakhstan and were usually subjected to a 
barrage of questions, not all of them polite or welcome. Other students had relatives and friends 
abroad who had communicated how they were received. Foreign friends wrote to some of those 
surveyed inquiring about the accuracy of the movie. One student was asked by a group of men in the 
US whether she could marry her brother in Kazakhstan (373), while another whether she was afraid 
of a vacuum cleaner (437). ‘My sister travelled to the USA and some of their teenagers laughed at her 
when she said that she was from Kazakhstan’ (170), said one Kazakh, while a young ethnic Russian 
reported that ‘everybody laughs when they hear ‘Kazakhstan’, I feel very upset about it’ (478). Despite 
such occurrences, those who had travelled to the West were much less likely to anticipate changed 
responses than those who had never left Kazakhstan (47.77% vs. 63.9%). But many of those who have 
felt the brunt, directly or indirectly, of Borat-inspired foreign prejudice were diffi  cult to assuage:
The whole fi lm is stupid, it humiliates the feeling of being Kazakh. It discriminates [against] our country 
and the Kazakh people /…/ If such [a] movie was about any European country, they would sue Mr. Cohen for 
humiliation of dignity and human rights. My brother is studying in [name deleted] school in London, when 
he says that he is from Kazakhstan, many people laugh now. He feels he is being discriminated against. Is it 
really funny, Mr. Cohen? (152) 
When asked whether the views of those featured in the movie were representative of Americans 
generally, the largest section of students (41.3%) didn’t know (in part explained by not seeing the 
movie, in part having insuffi  cient fi rst-hand experience of the US or Americans). Those who had seen 
the movie, however, were almost twice as likely to believe the Americans depicted were representative 
(47.5% vs. 25.8%). In terms of ethnic breakdown, Kazakhs were more likely than Russians to think 
the views representative (36.8%, 29.86%), though less likely than Tatars (41.7%) and others (41.7%). 
Those who wrote comments on this subject generally had a poor opinion of Americans. ‘Regular 
Americans are stupid guys with Big Macs and cokes. They don’t even know that Kazakhstan is outside 
of America,’ off ered a young Kazakh from Shymkent (374). Many bemoaned American ignorance of 
world geography, which was attributed to the ‘fact’ that most Americans were under-educated (374), 
though some made a distinction between urban and rural Americans. Others who had spent time in 
the US cited fl aws in the American way of life. Frustration was expressed that many Westerners felt 
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that Kazakhstanis ‘live in the desert and go to school on camels’ (200) or ‘live without a civilisation’ 
(329). Some respondents, however, urged their fellow-citizens not to take the movie personally: ‘I 
think American movies show American culture from the bad side too. If it were a movie about any 
other country, it would be funny for us. Why should we behave as if someone hurt us?’ (404). 
Perfi dious Uncle Sam
The issue of outside involvement refl ected the early position of the Nazarbayev regime, which had 
suggested that some (unnamed) foreign government was behind the Borat skits. This was perhaps 
symptomatic of what Andrew Wilson has called ‘virtual politics’ in many parts the post-Soviet sphere 
(Wilson 2005). Since elections are a charade, democracy purely a façade, and freedom of expression 
heavily circumscribed, little politics occurs in Kazakhstan that does not have the govern ment 
stamp of approval. As one Almaty student put it, ‘It’s possible [a foreign government is involved], 
because he is really popular! How can he become popular without [such] support?’ (230). Rather 
than being spontaneous, variable, and diverse, politics for the Kazakhstani government is something 
to be managed, manipulated and contained. Thus, when confronted with the Borat phenomenon, 
something so subversive to the regime’s pretensions, there was a reactive twitch that blamed external 
sabotage. This may be also partly attributable to the Soviet training of Nazarbayev regime; after all, 
the USSR regularly blamed domestic embarrassments on foreign subversion. It is also possible that 
the Kazakhstani authorities were infl uenced by the fi lm antics of Aleksey Mitrofanov. In the same year 
as Borat’s MTV performance, this former Soviet Interior Ministry offi  cial turned Russian right-wing 
parliamentarian produced a semi-pornographic movie involving the sexual adventures of Misha and 
Yulia, who bore an uncanny resemblance to Mikheil Saakashvili and Yulia Timoshenko, Georgian and 
Ukrainian leaders, respectively, and the betes noires of Russia’s political elite. Offi  cial protests from 
Georgia and Ukraine followed, and rumours circulated that Ukrainians were planning a retaliatory gay 
movie starring doubles of Vladimir Putin and Viktor Yanukovych (Smith 2005, AFP 2005, O’Flynn 2005). 
The political skirmishing that accompanied this erotic parody and the fact that the fi gures of fun were 
also top targets for Kremlin attacks may have played a part in convincing Nazarbayev’s regime that 
these spoofs represented a new type of ‘political technology’ designed to discredit opponents. 
Many students dismissed the idea that a foreign government was behind the Borat fi lm and argued 
that it was most likely a purely commercial venture with no political overtones. While less than 
a fi fth of students (19.4%) thought a foreign government was certainly involved in the making of 
the movie, less than half ruled out the possibility (44.3%). Kazakhs were far surer than Russians of 
foreign government involvement (22.5% vs. 3%), while three quarters of Tatars ruled it out, as did 
all fi ve Ukrainian students. Of the 93 students who thought a government was involved, fi fty (10.6% 
of total) mentioned the United States. Marketing and journalism majors were least likely to suspect 
foreign involvement (5.2%, 6.2%). One respondent wondered if some US government fi gures might 
have supported Borat so as to exert ‘ideological leverage on Kazakhstan re human rights’ (348), while 
another blamed Central Asian states which, jealous of Kazakhstan’s predominance, sought to block 
its ‘recognition by the world’ (361). America, and to a lesser extent the West generally, was the usual 
suspect, however. 
Conclusion
As one might expect from a government untutored in the joys of critical thinking, the Nazarbayev 
regime responded to the Borat movie with a mixture of fury and disbelief. Desperate to replace its 
image as a corrupt backwater country, Kazakhstan tried hard to develop the image of a regional 
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leader, but Borat challenged eff orts by political elites to create an attractive ‘brand’ for the new state 
(Economist 2006). In a battle of satire, the Nazarbayev regime was comprehensively outgunned, and 
in the end, after considerable foot stamping, somewhat graciously accepted defeat. 
Survey participants didn’t off er a homogenous reaction to the Borat phenomenon but responded 
with a wide range of emotions and viewpoints. Despite the Borat ban in Kazakhstan and Russia, 
almost half of the students surveyed had watched the fi lm and most, irrespective of whether they 
had seen the movie or not, disagreed with the ban. Some were unsure why Kazakhstan had been 
singled out for ridicule, but many accepted that the fi lm was a commercial enterprise with no foreign 
government involvement. Others felt that Cohen had simply capitalised on Kazakhstan’s obscurity 
and that as a young, developing country, Kazakhstan was an easy target. Enthusiasm for the increased 
attention was for many tempered by a fear that many foreigners might develop negative perceptions 
of the country. In many cases, there was an underlying frustration at Kazakhstan’s lack of recognition 
despite its successes and a latent disregard for perceived American ignorance. Yet another version 
of this tale of exploiting Kazakhstan’s vulnerabilities was the suggestion that as a weak state in 
international aff airs Kazakhstan could not respond eff ectively to the propaganda assault. The random 
nature of the choice compounded the injustice for some; Kazakhstan, it seemed, was chosen for 
ridicule not as part of a conspiracy or contempt but simply for no reason at all. 
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